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Abstract
Background: Current national preparedness plans require local health departments to play an
integral role in responding to an influenza pandemic, a major public health threat that the World
Health Organization has described as "inevitable and possibly imminent". To understand local public
health workers' perceptions toward pandemic influenza response, we surveyed 308 employees at
three health departments in Maryland from March – July 2005, on factors that may influence their
ability and willingness to report to duty in such an event.
Results: The data suggest that nearly half of the local health department workers are likely not to
report to duty during a pandemic. The stated likelihood of reporting to duty was significantly
greater for clinical (Multivariate OR: 2.5; CI 1.3–4.7) than technical and support staff, and
perception of the importance of one's role in the agency's overall response was the single most
influential factor associated with willingness to report (Multivariate OR: 9.5; CI 4.6–19.9).
Conclusion: The perceived risk among public health workers was shown to be associated with
several factors peripheral to the actual hazard of this event. These risk perception modifiers and
the knowledge gaps identified serve as barriers to pandemic influenza response and must be
specifically addressed to enable effective local public health response to this significant threat.
Background
Local health departments are considered the backbone of
public health response plans for any and all infectious dis-
ease outbreaks. An influenza pandemic is considered
increasingly likely, and is now considered one of the most
significant and urgent threats to the nation's public health
preparedness infrastructure. It has been argued that of the
12 disaster scenarios recently assessed by the U.S. Depart-
ment of Homeland Security, pandemic influenza is the
most likely and perhaps the most deadly[1]. The United
States pandemic influenza plan released in November
2005, lays out a critical role for local and state public
health agencies during a pandemic, including: providing
regular situational updates for providers; providing guid-
ance on infection control measures for healthcare and
non-healthcare settings; conducting or facilitating testing
and investigation of pandemic influenza cases; and inves-
tigating and reporting special pandemic situations[2].
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These specified activities would require an extensive
prompt response by local health departments. Current
contingency plans account for possible personnel short-
ages due to influenza morbidity, but previous studies have
shown that during extreme scenarios, a varying propor-
tion of healthcare workers may be unable or unwilling to
report to duty [3-5]. This may be even truer for health
departments, where unlike more "traditional" first
responder agencies (such as law enforcement, fire services,
and emergency medical services), the capacity and will-
ingness to respond 24/7 to crises is not historically
ingrained in the workforces' professional cultures and
training. Even in the post-9/11 environment, recent data
indicate inconsistent and sometimes slow after-hours
response by health departments to urgent events involv-
ing communicable disease[6].
Risk perception theory provides a revealing framework for
better understanding response limitations and needs of
the public health workforce. The perceived risk, according
to this theory, is a multifactorial phenomenon, involving
the summation of actual risk and other peripheral influ-
ences independent of the actual risk, such as perceived
authority, trust, and situational control; these peripheral
influences have been termed "outrage"[7] or "dread."[8].
Based on these models, it was previously suggested that
contributing factors peripheral to the actual risk will have
a considerable practical impact on how public health
employees would respond in a crisis[9]. Aside from phys-
ical and circumstantial barriers such as availability of
transportation or dependency of family members, we
have identified specific risk perception issues whose
impact may be markedly high and of unique importance
for the public health workforce's response to a crisis.
These factors, or modifiers, stem from a number of fea-
tures previously suggested to have been associated with
elevated risk perception, including manageability of the
threat; risk to future generations; direct personal impact;
and sense of control over events.
Based on these modifiers, several major barriers to effec-
tive public health workforce emergency response were
suggested; these include uncertainty regarding working
environment safety, unclear expectations of role-specific
emergency response requirements, safety and well being
of family members, inadequate emphasis on the critical
value of each employee to the agency response efforts, and
insufficient emphasis on stress management techniques –
all of which may heighten employees' sense of dread due
to a lack of personal control[9].
In light of the projected impact of an influenza pandemic,
health departments must optimize the response rate of
their employees in this crisis scenario. Based on the emer-
gency response principle that all disasters are "local"[10],
we have set out to assess local public health employees'
risk perception and likelihood of reporting to duty during
a local outbreak of pandemic influenza, and to uncover
the variables that affect these outcomes, thus providing a
needed evidence base for health departments' planning
and training efforts.
Methods
We conducted the study in Carroll, Dorchester, and Har-
ford county health departments between March 2005 and
July 2005. All three health departments are located in
Maryland, and range in size from 132 employees to 225
employees. We selected these health departments because
of their location in communities ranging from 30,000 on
Maryland's Eastern Shore (Dorchester County) to
235,000 in the greater Baltimore/Towson metropolitan
area (Harford County)[11], thus reflecting the 96% of the
nation's local public health agencies serving communities
with populations of 500,000 or fewer[12]. Self- adminis-
tered anonymous surveys were sent to all health depart-
ment personnel by their respective health departments.
Completed surveys were directly mailed to investigators at
the Johns Hopkins Center for Public Health Preparedness.
Survey content
The survey included questions on personal characteristics
such as job classification, gender, and age. The respond-
ents used a 5-point Likert scale for questions pertaining to
a possible flu pandemic: probability of them reporting to
work ("very likely" to "not at all likely"); possibility of
being asked by their health department to respond to an
emergency ("very likely" to "not at all likely"); how
knowledgeable they thought they were about the poten-
tial public health impact of pandemic influenza ("very
knowledgeable" to "not at all knowledgeable"); how con-
fident they were about being safe in their work roles ("very
confident" to "not at all confident"); how likely was their
family prepared to function in their absence ("very likely"
to "not at all likely"); how likely they felt their health
department would provide them with timely updates
("very likely" to "not at all likely"); how familiar they were
with their role specific response requirements ("very
familiar" to "not at all familiar"); how well they thought
they could address the questions of a concerned member
of the public ("very well" to "not at all"); how significant
a role they thought they would play in the agency's overall
response ("very significant" to "not at all significant");
how important would be pre-event preparation and train-
ing ("very important" to "not at all important"); how
important it was for them to have psychological support
available during the event ("very important" to "not at all
important"); and how important it was for them to have
psychological support available after the event ("very
important" to "not at all important").BMC Public Health 2006, 6:99 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2458/6/99
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The job classification variable was collapsed into techni-
cal/support staff (such as computer entry staff, clerical
staff (e.g. receptionists), computer specialists, health
information systems data analysts etc.), and professional
staff. The latter included public health officials, clinical
staff (e.g., nurse, dentist, physician), public health com-
municable disease staff, environmental health staff, pub-
lic information staff, and other public health professional
staff (e.g., health educator, legal professional, financial
officer, other).
Data analysis
We dichotomized the responses to the job classification
question into professional and technical/support catego-
ries. Questions about likelihood of reporting to work and
pandemic influenza-related attitudes and beliefs were
dichotomized into responses with a score two or less, and
all other responses. We used logistic regression to com-
pute Odds Ratios to evaluate the association of demo-
graphic variables and attitudes and beliefs with self-
described likelihood of reporting to work. We used multi-
variate logistic regression to explore associations between
attitudes and beliefs related to pandemic influenza pre-
paredness and self-described likelihood of reporting to
work. The model included adjustment for age, gender,
and job classification. Similarly, we used bivariate and
multivariate (adjusted for age, gender, and job classifica-
tion) logistic regression models to evaluate the associa-
tion between the various attitudes and beliefs. In order to
assess non-response bias, we compared age, gender, and
job classification distributions for the respondents and for
all health department personnel.
We used TeleForm Version 8 (Cardiff, Vista, CA) and Stata
Version 9 (Stata Corporation, College Station, TX) for
data capturing and analysis respectively.
Results
We received 118 out of 205 (57.6%), 74 out of 128
(57.8%), and 116 out of 198 (58.6%) surveys fromCar-
roll, Dorchester, and Harford county health departments
respectively, resulting in an overall response rate of 58.0%
(n = 308). We did not find a statistically significant differ-
ence in age and gender distribution between the respond-
ents and all health department personnel. A small yet
statistically significant difference in the proportion of
technical/support staff (vs. professional staff) was
detected (22.4% vs. 32% in the study group and all per-
sonnel respectively, p = 0.003), yet no significant differ-
ence in the proportions of professional staff subgroups
was detected.
Of the 303 who responded to the question about their
likelihood of reporting during a pandemic influenza
related emergency, 163 (53.8%) indicated they would
likely report to work during such an emergency. Age and
gender did not have an association with likelihood of
reporting. Clinical staff indicated a higher likelihood of
reporting (Multivariate OR: 2.5; CI 1.3–4.7) than techni-
cal/support staff (Table 1).
Only 40% of all respondents- 45.1% professional staff
and 26.1% technical/support staff – felt it was likely they
would be asked by their health department to respond to
a pandemic influenza related emergency. Perception of
Table 1: Demographic characteristics of the study population
Likelihood of Reporting
Characteristic n(%) Bivariate OR (95%CI) Multivariate OR†(95%CI)
Age
20–30 20 (6.6) Reference Reference
30–40 48 (15.8) 1.2 (0.4–3.4) 0.9 (0.3–2.8)
40–50 102 (33.6) 1.3 (0.5–3.3) 0.8 (0.3–2.5)
50–60 107 (35.2) 1.3 (0.5–3.3) 0.9 (0.3–2.5)
Over 60 27 (8.9) 0.9 (0.3–3) 0.5 (0.1–1.9)
Gender
Male 51 (17) Reference Reference
Female 249 (83) 0.7 (0.4–1.4) 0.6 (0.3–1.2)
Job Classification
Technical/Support Staff 69 (22.4) Reference Reference
Public health official 7 (2.3) 2.6 (0.5–14.2) 1.9 (0.3–11)
Clinical staff (e.g., nurse, dentist, physician) 102 (33.1) 2.3 (1.2–4.4) 2.5 (1.3–4.7)
Public health communicable disease staff 12 (3.9) 3.1 (0.8–12.4) 3 (0.7–12.1)
Environmental health staff 39 (12.7) 0.9 (0.4–1.9) 0.6 (0.2–1.4)
Public Information Staff 8 (2.6) 0.3 (0.1–1.8) 0.4 (0.1–1.9)
Other Public Health Professional Staff (e.g., health 
educator, legal professional, financial officer, other)
71 (23.1) 0.7 (0.3–1.3) 0.6 (0.3–1.1)
†Adjusted for Age, Gender, Job ClassificationBMC Public Health 2006, 6:99 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2458/6/99
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likely to be asked by the Health Department to respond
was associated with self-described likelihood of reporting
(Multivariate OR : 8.5; 95%CI 4.6–15.6). Only 33.4%
(101) individuals thought of themselves to be knowledge-
able about the public health impact of pandemic influ-
enza (Table 2). Perception of one's existing knowledge
about pandemic influenza, and perception of having an
important role in the agency's overall response were sig-
nificantly higher among professional staff compared to
technical/support staff (Figure 1),
In multivariate analysis, increased self-described likeli-
hood of reporting to work during an influenza pandemic
emergency was significantly associated with agreement
with several constructs, most notably perception of the
capacity to communicate risk effectively, perception of the
importance of one's role in the agency's overall response,
and familiarity with one's role-specific response require-
ments in a pandemic influenza related emergency. (Table
2).
The vast majority (83%) of the respondents felt they
would benefit from additional training activities. A lower
perceived level of familiarity with one's role was not sig-
nificantly associated with a higher perceived need for
additional training (Multivariate OR: 1.4; CI 0.6–3.4).
Most of the respondents also perceive psychological sup-
port during the event (57.1%) and post-event psycholog-
ical support (61.3%) as important. Psychological support
during and after the event was deemed more important by
staff who considered themselves likely to be asked to
report to duty during an event (Multivariate OR [CI]: 2.4
[1.4–4.2] and 2.8 [1.6–4.8], respectively).
Sixty-six percent of the respondents perceived themselves
to be at personal risk when performing their duties during
such an event. Confidence in personal safety was associ-
ated with several constructs independently of one's job
classification, including perception of existing knowledge
about public health impact of pandemic influenza (Mul-
tivariate OR: 4.1; CI 2.3–7.6); family preparation (Multi-
variate OR: 2.5; CI 1.4–4.3); health department's
perceived ability to provide timely information (Multivar-
iate OR: 5.4; CI 2.7–10.7); perception of the capacity to
effectively communicate risk (Multivariate OR: 4.8; CI
2.6–9.0); perception of the importance of one's role in the
agency's overall response (Multivariate OR: 4.1; CI 2.9–
7.7); and familiarity with one's role-specific response
requirements (Multivariate OR: 3.5; CI 1.8–6.2).
The associations between self-identified likelihood of
reporting to work and perception of one's capacity to
effectively communicate risk were substantially stronger
for technical/support staff compared to professional staff
(Bivariate OR [CI]: 19.4 [2.4–160.4] vs. 5.9 [2.9–12.2],
respectively) (Figure 2).
Discussion
The World Health Organization has urged all countries to
prepare for the next influenza pandemic, which it termed
Table 2: Associations of attitudes and beliefs regarding pandemic influenza preparedness with projected likelihood of reporting to duty 
by local health department personnel.
Construct Agreement n(%) Bivariate OR (95%CI) Multivariate Model†OR 
(95%CI)
Perception of existing knowledge about public 
health impact of pandemic influenza
101 (33.4) 3.5 (2.1–5.9) 3.1 (1.8–5.5)
Confidence in personal safety 100 (33.8) 4.4 (2.6–7.6) 4 (2.2–7.2)
Family preparation 155 (51.7) 2.4 (1.5–3.8) 2.1 (1.2–3.4)
Health Department's perceived ability to 
provide timely information
195 (64.6) 2.4 (1.5–3.8) 2.3 (1.3–3.8)
Perception of the capacity to effectively 
communicate risk
80 (26.6) 7.1 (3.6–13.9) 6.6 (3.2–13.5)
Familiarity with one's role-specific response 
requirements
71 (23.1) 7.2 (3.5–14.7) 7.6 (3.4–16.9)
Perception of the importance of one's role in 
the agency's overall response
93 (31.1) 10.4 (5.3–20.3) 9.5 (4.6–19.9)
Perceived importance of preparedness training 
and education
254 (83.8) 3.8 (1.9–7.5) 3.4 (1.6–7.1)
* A score of 4 or 5 on the likert-type scale
† Adjusted for Age, Gender, Job ClassificationBMC Public Health 2006, 6:99 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2458/6/99
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in mid-2004 "inevitable and possibly imminent"[13]. The
federally adopted U.S. model of all-hazards emergency
readiness has presented local health departments with
new organizational challenges and learning curves. The
all-hazards approach entails an ability and willingness to
respond to a broad spectrum of disasters, ranging from the
intentional (e.g., chemical, biological, or radiological ter-
ror) to the naturally occurring (e.g., weather-related crises
or non-bioterrorism related infectious disease)[14].
Current national contingency plans account for possible
personnel shortages within the healthcare and public
health settings, mainly due to the expected influenza mor-
bidity among workers. Yet our data suggest that regardless
of the expected morbidity among personnel during an
influenza pandemic, nearly half of the local health depart-
ment workers are likely not to report to duty during such
an extreme public health crisis. In fact, most of the work-
ers (and nearly three out of four technical/support work-
ers) do not believe they will even be asked to report to
work.
We have found that the willingness to report to duty dur-
ing a pandemic varies considerably according to the indi-
vidual's job classification. Clinical staff state they are
significantly more likely to report to duty, compared with
all other workers. This difference correlates well with the
single most influential construct associated with willing-
ness to report to duty – the perception of the importance
of one's role in the agency's overall response. Less than a
third of the respondents believed they will have an impor-
tant role in the agency's response to local outbreaks of
pandemic influenza, but within this subgroup, willing-
ness to report to duty was as high as 86.8%. Belief in the
importance of one's role was lowest among technical/sup-
port staff, environmental health staff, and other non-clin-
ical professional staff (15.1%, 18.4% and 18.8%
respectively), groups in which willingness to report was
shown to be lowest. We therefore believe further efforts
must be directed at ensuring that all local public health
workers, but most notably non-clinical professional staff,
understand in advance the importance of their role during
an influenza pandemic – otherwise they will fail to show
up when they are most needed.
Our findings fit well in the theoretical framework empha-
sizing risk communication needs of public health work-
ers, who themselves serve as risk communicators[9].
Several factors, previously suggested to be risk perception
"modifiers" [9] of substantial impact on public health
Proportion of individuals who agreed with each of the attitude and belief constructs by staff type Figure 1
Proportion of individuals who agreed with each of the attitude and belief constructs by staff type.
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workforce's response to a crisis, indeed proved to be
important in this context. Lack of knowledge, ambiguity
regarding one's exact tasks, and questionable ability in
performing one's role as risk communicator were all sig-
nificantly associated with a higher perceived personal risk
and a two- to ten-fold decrease in willingness to report to
duty; these factors proved to be more influential even than
the perceived level of family preparedness to function in
one's absence. It is therefore important to recognize that
public health employees, who are intended to serve as
purveyors of risk communication for their communities,
themselves represent a community with specific percep-
tions that must be addressed in the context of emergency
readiness training.
The threat of an impending influenza pandemic is not a
new one – pandemics have been taking place once every
several decades for over 300 years. Yet it was only in the
last couple of years, as highly pathogenic H5N1 strain
became increasingly endemic in southeast Asia and as
lethal infections with the virus occurred in an alarmingly
increasing rate among humans, that the urgency of the sit-
uation was openly declared by national and international
health authorities. The rapidity of this evolving situation
may serve to explain why only one third of the respond-
ents felt they were adequately knowledgeable on pan-
demic influenza, and why only one in five respondents
felt capable in effectively communicating pandemic risks.
This finding is especially noteworthy, in that members of
the public health support staff may become frontline tele-
phone risk communicators in a crisis, serving as the first
points of interface for concerned callers contacting a
health department. Only one of the 35 technical/support
staff workers who felt incapable of effective risk commu-
nication was willing to report to duty, even though most
of them believed the health department will have the abil-
ity to provide timely information.
The study has some relevant limitations that must be fac-
tored into the overall analysis. First, the sample was lim-
ited to three non-randomly selected health departments,
none of which serves a community larger than 250,000
residents, and all of which have staff sizes under 250. The
sample size of 308 survey employees limited this study's
power. As the study includes Maryland health depart-
ments only, it does not account for potential jurisdic-
tional or regional variations nationwide in response
capacity or risk perceptions toward pandemic influenza
response. Furthermore, the job classifications – based on
those used to develop the CDC-adopted emergency pre-
paredness competencies[15] – do not necessarily map
neatly onto functional responsibilities in disaster
Odds Ratios of reporting to work in case of a pandemic-influenza-related emergency by staff and attitude or belief construct Figure 2
Odds Ratios of reporting to work in case of a pandemic-influenza-related emergency by staff and attitude or belief construct.
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response. For example, health educators may play as
frontline a role as clinical staff, in terms of their degree of
interface with the public in a disaster. Our job categories
therefore do not necessarily reflect the relative impacts of
job-specific cohorts on disaster response in the event that
they do not report to work.
We assessed the presence and the direction of non-
response bias by comparing the distribution of personal
characteristics for the respondents and for all health
department personnel. The lack of significant difference
in age and gender distribution, as well as the lack of signif-
icant difference in job classification other than technical/
support staff indicates that the extent of such a bias in the
study is probably limited. The small yet statistically signif-
icant over-representation of technical/support staff in our
study group may potentially have caused a slight underes-
timation of overall willingness to report. However, as the
internal associations between the various variables were
also studied separately for the technical/support staff and
professional staff (Figure 2), this over-representation
should not impact the general conclusions presented
above.
Having accounted for these limitations, it is important to
note that the findings were internally consistent among
the three surveyed health departments. Although none of
the health departments served large metropolitan areas
and all had fewer than 250 employees, it must also be rec-
ognized that only 4% of the nation's local health depart-
ments serve populations of 500,000 or more, and that
local public health agencies tend to have small staff sizes
(with a median of 13 full time employees)[12].
Interestingly, our findings show similar patterns to data
on the willingness of urban healthcare workers from non-
public health settings to respond to emergencies: a survey
of 6248 employees from 47 healthcare facilities in the
New York City area revealed that these workers were least
willing (48%) to report to duty during an untreatable nat-
urally-occurring infectious disease outbreak affecting their
facility (SARS), compared to other disaster scenarios[5].
In our study we have detected similar rates of likelihood
to report to duty, although lower rates could have been
expected in our study population since the New York City
survey focused on healthcare workers whose organiza-
tional cultures are historically much more accustomed
than that of local public health workers to emergency
response, in a city with a heightened awareness of disaster
preparedness in the wake of the World Trade Center
attacks and subsequent anthrax attacks[5].
In the face of a pandemic influenza threat, local health
department employees' unwillingness to report to duty
may pose a threat to the nation's emergency response
infrastructure. Addressing the specific factors associated
with this unwillingness is necessary to help ensure that
existing local health department preparedness competen-
cies[15] will translate into the scope of response described
in the nation's pandemic influenza plans[2]. Interven-
tions suggested to enhance the willingness of healthcare
workers in non-public health department settings to
report to duty in disasters include workforce preparedness
education[5], provision of appropriate personal protec-
tive equipment, [4,14] crisis counseling, family prepared-
ness and social support[5,16].
These recommendations fit well within the framework of
our findings, and we further recommend that such educa-
tion programs include specialized training emphasizing
the specific nature of, and guidelines for, one's role in
response to pandemic influenza; the relevance of each
worker's role in the effectiveness of an overall public
health response; and the workers' ability to provide effec-
tive risk communication. Additional research must further
focus on best practice models for addressing the above
described gaps in local public health response to this
urgent public health threat.
Conclusion
These data offer a current, evidence-based window into
the needs of public health workers who would serve as a
backbone of locally-driven emergency response in an
influenza pandemic setting. We found that most of these
workers feel they will work under significant personal risk,
in a scenario they are not adequately knowledgeable
about, performing a role they are not sufficiently trained
for, and believing this role does not have a significant
impact on the agency's overall response. These specific
perceptions and needs must be attended, and specific
intervention programs must be initiated. In order to
reduce the perceived risk associated with the worker's role
in an influenza pandemic, each worker must have better
understanding of the scenario and importance of his or
her personal role within these settings, confidence that the
agency will provide adequate protective equipment for its
employees, psychological support and timely informa-
tion, and a belief of being well-trained to cope with emer-
gency responsibilities including the ability to
communicate risk to others. In view of what is currently
considered to be an impending influenza pandemic, a
wide gap between these desired targets and current status
exists, that may lead to significant hindrance in the ability
of local health departments to function adequately.
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